Increasing Military Agility by Diversifying Pathways to Senior Leadership
This report was written for the Jackson Institute class GLBL 765: Contemporary Issues in American Diplomacy and National Security at Yale University, taught by Ambassador John Negroponte.
To: The President of the United States
From: The National Security Advisor
Subject: Increasing Military Agility by Diversifying Pathways to Senior Leadership
Executive Summary
The world order is facing rapid and continual change in the shift to Great Power Competition, as the digital age surfaces the pre-existing complexity of global order in ways confounding any individual’s ability to comprehend and prepare. 9 The government must diversify preparatory capabilities through a whole-of-government approach, which is directly supported by diversifying the skills and experiences of those destined for senior leadership.
The centralized human resource practices of the military impose artificial constraints, which once made sense in previous eras, on developing and promoting the best talent. Unfortunately, efforts to adopt practices popular in corporate sector (decades ago) are only gaining inch-by-inch on a battlefield of thought diversity and preparedness to adapt to the unpredictable. The military can no longer gradually impose corporate practices upon preexisting bureaucratic talent management programs. Instead, we raise this strategic national security imperative to the level of Presidential accountability to ensure a transformation in the diversity of intellectual flexibility and skills of our senior military leaders over the next 10 years.
Our primary recommendations (see Recommendations for detailed opportunities):
- Value-Contribution Orientation: replace command performance/potential and bureaucratic checks with rigorous value-contribution talent management.
- Talent Availability: within an organization that generally cannot recruit externally, ensure enough of the right people, with the right skills, at the right time.
- Skill and Experience Development: Ensure greater diversity of skills and experiences by diversifying the broadening experiences and tying them to localized talent requirements.
- Remove Artificial Constraints: Remove cultural and institutional barriers which prevent adoption of value-contribution orientation.
Great Power Competition Context
The world order is facing rapid and continual change in the shift to Great Power Competition, as the digital age surfaces the pre-existing complexity of global order in ways confounding any individual’s ability to comprehend and prepare. 9 The government simply must diversify preparatory capabilities through a whole-of-government approach, which is directly supported by diversifying the skills and experiences of those destined for senior leadership.
The pace of global change demonstrates the need for skillsets and thinkers capable of resiliency and adaptability. This is a world in which videos of self-immolation in Tunisia14 spark unorganized, yet digitally socially networked, movements that quickly and effectively topple governments. No wall can prevent an unforeseeable threat, just as the French built a wall15 to prevent German invasions post-WWI. New, fast moving German tanks simply went around the wall — an unforeseen innovation that made a fixed and physical wall meaningless.
Following the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. national security apparatus accelerated and cemented a shift to counterterrorism. Military units such as the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command created operational frameworks like F3EAD (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate) 17 to guide the integration of intelligence with military operations to defeat a non-traditional foe, Al Qaeda in Iraq. Changes such as these increased, with minimal additional resources, the capability of the Task Force to run 300 raids per month by 2008, vs just 10 in 2004.10
With the military’s transformation to counterterrorism competency complete, the military is yet encountering the need to transform operational capabilities to meet the complex challenges of Great Power Competition. As Paul Bracken of Yale University put it, 12 “The prevailing language at the Pentagon is about kill-chains. We need to start talking about value chains. Kill chains are about efficiently killing people. Value chains are about deciding if we should.” Great Power Competition requires a new emphasis: that of irregular warfare. The recently unclassified Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy2 stated, “Our adversaries seek to undercut our global influence, degrade our relationships with key allies and partners, and shape the global environment to their advantage without provoking a U.S. conventional response.” Influence building is now an objective of the national security apparatus, of which the military must also support and play a critical role.
Influence, unlike a kill-chain which results in a bullet or a bomb, is inherently complex. Walmart carries 142,000 items13 because different people want different things at different times. So it is with influence; there might be 142,000 or more approaches necessary to build influence. It is not the military’s role to build this many influence capabilities — it is practically impossible for strategic planners to develop or even conceive of so many capabilities — but rather to have the diverse partnerships outside of the military to support influence objectives alongside traditional military actions. Thus, the military, at all levels and especially senior levels, must increase the diversity of skills and knowledge of its personnel, for the purpose of building partnerships and adapting to unpredictable and unprecedented events, such as viral social media prompting the Arab Spring.14
Present and Future States
Different branches of the military have utilized different personnel management methods over history. The U.S. Navy, alone of all the other branches, is known for the acronym UNODIR, “Unless Otherwise DIRected.” 20 We see two different navies in history who employed this empowered responsibility: Commodore Perry in 1852 acted with full authority of the President of the United States in his mission to open Japan, given the lack of ability to communicate quickly across the ocean in that time.18 Admiral Nelson in his battle at Trafalgar employed a battle tactic that inflicted chaos, so that even the Admiral could not communicate with his captains. He left his captains with the instruction, “No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy.” 16
These two historical events contrast with General Grant’s micro-managerial control over his subordinates in the Civil War. He wrote detailed letters describing when to move, where to move, how far to move, and when to adjust course.19
The first two situations demonstrate eventual distribution of authority coupled with years-long cultivated trust. The latter situation reflects modern military talent management practices: centralized management of individual careers through detailed, complicated processes.
This can be seen at senior levels. The Marine Corps 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance states “The current manpower model … cuts careers off near the 20-year mark when workers have decades of productivity left in them.” 23 Despite that infantry and aviators comprise 38% of active officers, 14 of 24 of the most senior officers originated in these two communities.22
Army officer careers follow complicated paths, encouraged by doctrinal handbooks outlining optimum paths.1 Broadening assignments, while essential for holistic skill and intellectual development, do not always result in career advancement. 1 An officer missing a promotional window defined by the year of commissioning may not receive another opportunity for advancement, or at least not as good of assignments. 1 Potential is defined as the potential for an officer to perform at the next job. Even if current performance is not quality, the officer may be promoted. Potential is not assessed on value contributions or the individual’s potential for their own career interests.1
Where the centralized entity does not control talent management, culture influences who and who does not succeed. Cultural tendencies, such as Army infantry officer “Ranger tab checks” enshrine long-term tradition that those who have gone through Ranger school are more qualified. This is despite that Ranger school teaches Vietnam-style infantry tactics. 1 These traditions have use in battlefield chaos for quick categorizations but might be of greater detriment when past designations immediately generate judgements on present relevance of skills or capability.
There is a critical math equation. In the behemoth bureaucracy of the Department of Defense, there are so many roles that must be filled over a certain timeline. Given the military almost exclusively recruits internally, except for specific, highly specialized roles such as medical professionals, the potential talent pool lies within. It is imperative to national security that a certain number of professionals reach certain professional goals over a timeline. With around 2 million active-duty personnel and reservists, 3 it is both an exceptionally large, uniquely qualified talent pool and a momentous challenge to manage talent. However, success in diversifying thought at senior levels has not yet been attained; for example, the Marine Corps is run by infantry and aviators.
Two corporate-esque talent management practices have been introduced to the Army recently, the Battalion Commander Application Process (BCAP) and the Aim 2.0 Virtual Marketplace.
The BCAP has an important national security function. Battalion command transitions tactical leaders into strategic roles, and, as one might expect, is preparation for future generals.1 The role of battalion commander also requires soft skills, such as “superior cognitive flexibility, cross-cultural fluency, and interpersonal skills.” 11 The previous process included a 90 second review of the Officer Evaluation Report before a decision. The new process is a corporate style, multi-day interview process including the ubiquitous STAR (situation, task, action, result) method of behavioral interviewing that draws out personal impact from stories.
AIM 2.04 is an Army job board employing a market-based mechanism to match talent intended to improve equity and transparency in recruitment practices. Prior and ongoing methods are inconsistent and often lacking in transparency.
Other new Army practices, such as the Opt In/Out6 of “year group” timelines, as still new and not fully rolled out. The Army Direct Commissioning page7 only lists 13 positions, which lack the typical details found of a job posting in the corporate sector. Although, an active-duty Sergeant First Class with a computer engineering degree was recently promoted to Major. 8
Recommendations
Our primary recommendations focus on reducing the extent to which a centralized bureaucracy must develop rigid processes dictating talent management by removing self-imposed barriers.
Value-Contribution Orientation: replace command performance/potential and bureaucratic checks with rigorous value-contribution talent management.
- Redefine performance and potential to value-contributed instead of the current capability to command
- Set processes and standards for hiring the right person, with the right skills, at the right time vs. one-size-fits-all
- End efforts to use data to design profiles of ideal candidates and other efforts to reduce hiring processes to controllable and optimizable variables, such as mandatory GRE exams in the Captain’s Career Course (regardless if interest in advanced education), 5 which are falling out of favor in academia and reflect only one’s ability to prepare for and take a test
Talent Availability: within an organization that generally cannot recruit externally, ensure enough of the right people, with the right skills, at the right time.
- Introduce new definition of military career success replacing “retiring after 20 years as a Lieutenant Colonel,” and adopt incentives to encourage progression and availability of senior leaders when needed
- Similarly, end the “year-group” promotional timeline process, which imposes unnecessary and complicated controls on individual careers
- Develop new training programs and proactive education in military and national security for civilians to create a diverse pool of civilian experts in varying disciplines that can be called upon to serve when unprecedented disruptive events call for new skills
- Similarly, redesign and simplify military entry processes and entry level jobs to encourage more young people to serve in the military, even if for 2 years, so that military jobs directly contribute to private sector career success
Skill and Experience Development: Ensure greater diversity of skills and experiences by diversifying the broadening experiences and tying them to localized talent requirements.
- Create broadening experiences which involve 6 months to 2-year rotations outside the military, including academia, industry, non-governmental organizations, and other governmental organizations
- Localize the creation of broadening experiences to ensure broadening experiences contribute to the development of relevant and necessary skills and personnel are not penalized for taking them
- Create and simplify re-onboarding for ex-military personnel to rejoin with commensurate reward for experience gained outside the military
Remove Artificial Constraints: Remove cultural and institutional barriers which prevent adoption of value-contribution orientation.
- Eliminate or clarify checklists, tokens, and traditional experiences culturally used to filter potential candidates, such as insignia representing participation in certain schools (e.g., the Ranger tab); require these items validate value-contribution (e.g., participation in a Ranger regiment).
- Eliminate career ceilings for enlisted personnel and position their technical strengths for greater value contribution in specialized and generalist management roles
- Redefine and reduce inflexibility in job descriptions from technician, staff, and commander to skills- and outcome-based specializations and better incept these skills into all organizations
Conclusion
The centralized human resource practices of the military impose artificial constraints, which once made sense in previous eras, on developing and promoting the best talent. Unfortunately, efforts to adopt practices popular in corporate sector (decades ago) are only gaining inch-by-inch on a battlefield of thought diversity and preparedness to adapt to the unpredictable. The Kennedy Administration’s strategic choice to make the Space Race about the moon avoided an expensive, incremental battle against the at-the-time superior Soviet satellite capabilities.21 In the same way, the military can no longer gradually impose corporate practices upon preexisting bureaucratic talent management programs. Instead, we raise this strategic national security imperative to the level of Presidential accountability to ensure a transformation in the diversity of intellectual flexibility and skills of our senior military leaders over the next 10 years.
References
1Interviews with four Soldiers, one Marine, and one Sailor
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Armed_Forces
4https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/assets/directorate/OPMD/What%20is%20AIM%202.pdf
7https://talent.army.mil/direct-commissioning/
9Team of Teams, Stanley McCrystal, 59
10One Mission, Chris Fussell, 11
11https://hbr.org/2020/11/reinventing-the-leader-selection-process
12Lecture, Paul Bracken, Yale University, Strategy, Technology, and War
13https://corporate.walmart.com/newsroom/2005/01/06/our-retail-divisions
15Team of Teams, Stanley McCrystal, 51
16Team of Teams, Stanley McCrystal, 30
17Team of Teams, Stanley McCrystal, 50
18Team of Teams, Stanley McCrystal, 204
19Team of Teams, Stanley McCrystal, 206
20Team of Teams, Stanley McCrystal, 207
21https://www.space.com/11336-space-race-united-states-soviets-spaceflight-50years.html
